In the late 1960s, Mexico began a series of anti-drug campaigns that relied heavily on military force, especially in the Golden Triangle, a region long known for marijuana and opium poppy production. Early operations like Canador (1969–1975) and Trizo (1976) tested new strategies to control drug cultivation, including harassment of farmers and the aerial destruction of crops. These efforts set the stage for Operation Condor (1977–1988), a much larger campaign that expanded these tactics and caused severe disruption in rural communities but failed to dismantle the drug industry itself.
This research examines how the United States influenced the militarization of Mexico’s drug policy and how the PRI government used this shift to strengthen its political control. It argues that Operation Condor acted not only as an anti-drug initiative but also as a counterinsurgency effort aimed at repressing social movements, weakening armed groups, removing certain drug traffickers, and reorganizing the drug trade to protect favored drug lords.
MATIAS JOFRE 